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Williamson: Commercial Law

COMMERCIAL LAW
I.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Columbia Gas of W. Va. v. Public Service Commission, 311 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va.
1983).
In Columbia Gas of W. Va. v. Public Service Commission' the West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals considered a challenge by Columbia Gas to West Virginia
Code section 24-2B-1,1 by which a one year moratorium was imposed on rate

increases for natural gas utilities. Columbia Gas had filed a notice of proposed
rate increases with the West Virginia Public Service Commission (Commission) in
July of 1982. 3 Pursuant to statute, 4 the Commission suspended the operation of
Columbia's proposed rates for the maximum allowable period of two hundred
seventy days beyond the thirty-day notice period. 5 Hearings were held in March

1983 concerning the proposed rate increase,' and in May 1983, a hearing examiner
entered his recommended order that Columbia should be granted a rate increase
of less than one-half of that requested." The examiner also recommended that the
increase be suspended until March 12, 1984, as permitted by the new act, West
Virginia Code section 24-2B-1.1 The original two hundred seventy day suspension
period was due to expire on June 8, 1983, so, in order to prevent the requested
rates from taking effect, the Commission entered an order on June 7, 1983, affirming the hearing examiner's recommendations, thereby suspending the recommended rate increase until March 12, 1984. 9 Columbia appealed the decision to suspend
its rate increase until March 12, 1984, claiming that West Virginia Code section
Columbia Gas of W. Va. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 311 S.E.2d 137 (W.Va. 1983).
2

W. VA. CODE § 24-2B-1 (Supp. 1984) provides in part:

[U]pon the effective date [March 12, 1983] of this article, the commission shall authorize
no increase of rates charged by any utility for natural gas to any customer of any class for
a period of twelve months. With respect to cases for rate increases which are pending before
the commission on the effective date [March 12, 19831 of this section, such cases may be
suspended by the commission and held in abeyance by the commission during the pendency
of the period of suspension mandated by this section or any such cases may proceed to completion and the commission may rule thereon upon the same to the same extent as if this
section had not been enacted, all within the sound discretion of the commission.
Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 138.
4 W. VA. CODE § 24-2-4a (1980 & Supp. 1984) requires public utilities to provide thirty days
notice of any proposed rate changes, during which time the Commission may suspend the operation
of the proposed rate changes. The statute further provides that "the Commission may suspend the
operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, .... but not for a longer period than two
hundred seventy days beyond the time when such rate . . . would otherwise go into effect."
I Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 139.
6 Id.
7Id.

Id. W. VA. CODE § 24-2B-1 (Supp. 1984).
Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 140. Because Columbia's case for a rate increase had been pending
on March 12, 1983, the effective date of § 24-2B-1, it was not mandatory that Columbia's requested
rate increase be suspended until March 12, 1984. However, the statute did permit the Public Service
Commission to do so at its discretion. 311 S.E.2d at 143.
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24-2B-1 was unconstitutional as it applied to Columbia's pending rate case. j In
a unanimous decision, the court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that
as it applied to Columbia's pending rate case, section 24-2B-1 did not violate either
the federal or state constitution."
The court first considered Columbia's contention that the statutory moratorium
on rate increases for natural gas utilities violated the due process or just compensation provisions of either the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution or article III, § 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. The court acknowledged
that a legislatively designated rate-making authority such as the Public Service Commission may set any rate it believes just and reasonable, provided that the rate
so determined does not amount to an unconstitutional confiscation of property
without just compensation.' 2 The court also agreed that "the deprivation of the
right to earn a reasonable rate of return, considering facts and circumstances and
economic realities of the times"' 3 is unconstitutionally confiscatory. " However,
rates set by the Commission are presumptively valid,II and Columbia failed to meet
its burden of proving that the Commission's decision to suspend the requested rate
increase, as authorized by section 24-2B-1, was confiscatory."
The court stressed that rates which are merely unreasonable do not necessarily
rise to the level of an unconstitutional confiscation.' 7 Hope Natural Gas v. Federal
Power Commission," a Fourth Circuit decision which was cited approvingly by
the court, discussed the need for a time lag in the regulatory decisionmaking process
since changing economic conditions prompt a reasonable period of rate
investigation. 9 While what constitutes a "reasonable" period may vary from case
to case, the court noted that, in other jurisdictions, rate increase moratoriums of
up to three years have been approved. 20
The court compared the situation before them with that present in the Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases,2' which was cited as strongly supportive of the constitutionality of section 24-2B-1 .22In the Permian Cases, there was a challenge to the
Federal Power Commission's decision to impose a two and one-half year moratorium

10Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 140.
1 Id. at 144.
12 Id. at 140.
"

Id. at 141.

" Id. (citing City of Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n, 89 W. Va. 703, 110 S.E. 192 (1921)).
15Id.
16

Id.

17

Id.

I Hope Natural Gas v. Federal Power Comm'n, 196 F.2d 803, 808-09 (1952).
19Id.

20 Columbia,

311 S.E.2d at 142 n.3 (citing Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga
Gas, Electric Light and Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693, 701 (1908)).
22 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
22 Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 142.
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on natural gas prices in excess of maximum area rates established by the
Commission.2 3 The United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
moratorium, stating that the relatively brief time period of the moratorium, combined with the availability of exceptions for companies threatened with undue hardship by the maximum rates, dispelled any potential constitutional problems with
confiscation or due process violations.24 Drawing upon the reasoning used in the
Permian Cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized in Columbia that the legislatively created moratorium of section 24-2B-1, as applied to Columbia's rate case, would only suspend Columbia's rate increase for, at most, the
relatively short period of nine months. 2" The court also pointed out that the potential danger of extreme financial hardships being imposed by the section 24-2B-1
moratorium was dealt with by the legislature in enacting West Virginia Code section 24-2B-2, which allowed the Commission to grant emergency rate increases during
the moratorium period if necessary to prevent such a hardship. 26 Accordingly, the
court held that section 24-2B-1 violated neither the due process nor just compensation clauses of either the West Virginia or United States Constitution."
The next issue considered by the court was whether section 24-2B-1 was an
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of legislative authority since it allowed
the Commission to exercise its discretion when deciding whether to apply the
moratorium to pending rate cases. 8 The court readily disposed of this argument,
stating that the standards supplied by West Virginia Code section 24-1-1(a) and
(b), which are satisfactorily explicit to guide the Commission in exercising its discretion as to basic rate making decisions, are also adequate to guide the Commission
in exercising its discretion as to temporary rate suspension decisions under section
24-2B-1.29 The "general guidelines" of section 24-1-1, coupled with the legislative
purposes behind section 24-2B-1 ,3 were sufficiently explicit in the court's eyes to
support a holding that section 24-2B-1 was a constitutionally valid delegation of
legislative authority. 3'
By its decision in Columbia, the court expressed its reluctance to intervene in
the legislative sphere when the regulation of public utility rates is involved. It would
appear that, in the future, the legislature will be accorded wide latitude to adopt
" Permian Cases, 390 U.S. 747.
Id.
21 Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 143.
24

26

Id.

State ex rel. Knight v. Public Service Comm'n, 245 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1978), in which
the court acknowledged the relatively free reign allowed the legislature to balance the interests of consumers and utility companies in determining reasonable rates.
23 Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 143.
27 Id. See

29

Id.

10In W. VA. CODE § 24-1-1(h)(1) and l(i) (Supp. 1984), the legislature expressed its displeasure
with the adverse consequences of recent dramatic rate increases. A desire was also expressed to limit
utilities' returns to a level more in line with the return earned by affiliates on transactions with sister utilities.
11Columbia, 311 S.E.2d at 144.
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short term rate increase moratoriums in order to deal with perceived social and
economic exigencies.
II.

DE1BTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS

Tomchin Furniture Co. v. Lester, 309 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1983).
Sauls v. Howell, 309 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. 1983).
ACF Industries v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 312 S.E.2d 746 (W. Va. 1983).
Southern Electrical Supply Co. v. Raleigh County National Bank, No. 15974
(W. Va. July 11, 1984).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was asked in Tomchin Furniture
Co. v. Lester32 to define the scope of the prejudgment hearing provided for in
West Virginia's detinue statute.3 The express language of section 55-6-1 concerning prejudgment hearings was interpreted to mean that a defendant must be allowed
to present defenses which would refute the alleged debt or the creditor's right to
3 4
assert a security interest.
In Lester, the appellee, a furniture company, had filed a detinue action seeking
to repossess certain furniture which appellants had purchased under two retail
installment agreements that had not been satisfied. 3 At a prejudgment hearing the
appellants, while not disputing the underlying debt, attempted to present evidence
concerning two potentially valid defenses to the debt.3 6 The trial court disallowed
this evidence, ruling that only evidence pertaining to the existence or nonexistence
37
of the debt was admissible at the prejudgment hearing.
On appeal, the supreme court overturned the trial court's decision. In an opinion
written by Justice Miller, the court noted that West Virginia Code sections 55-6-1
and 55-6-2 3 are to be construed in pari materiaand that these two provisions were
promulgated by the legislature in response to a number of cases which held that
Tomchin Furniture Co. v. Lester, 309 S.E.2d 73 fV. Va. 1983).
§ 55-6-1 (Supp. 1984) states:
If the plaintiff in a civil action, whether in a circuit court or magistrate court, for the recovery
of specific goods, chattels, or intangible personal property, shall demand immediate possession thereof, a prejudgment hearing shall be held in not less than five nor more than ten
days after service upon the defendant of the summons, a verified complaint describing said
personal property, and a notice of the time, place, and purpose of the prejudgment hearing.
At the prejudgment hearing an inquiry shall be held to determine: (a) the nature of the right
or contract under which the plaintiff claims a right to immediate possession; and (b) the
nature of the defendant's right to retain possession thereof.
32

31 W. VA. CODE

" Lester, 309 S.E.2d at 77.
" Id. at 74-75.
36 Id. at 75.

Id.
W. VA. CODE § 55-6-2 (Supp. 1984) provides in part that "If the court or magistrate shall
conclude, upon the basis of the evidence adduced at such prejudgment hearing, that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail upon trial of the action upon the merits," then the property
may be seized after the plaintiff posts a bond.
37
S
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certain prejudgment seizures conducted without notice and a hearing were violative
of procedural due process. 9 The court examined a portion of section 55-6-1 which
states, "At the prejudgment hearing an inquiry shall be held to determine: (a) the
nature of the right or contract under which the plaintiff claims a right to immediate
possession; and (b) the nature of the defendant's right to retain possession thereof.""0
The court then determined from this language that "[T]he statute, by referring
to the 'defendant's right to retain possession,' must be taken to mean that the defendant is able to present defenses that would defeat the underlying debt or the right
to assert the security interest."4 " While there is scant authority discussing the exact
scope of this type of prejudgment hearing, the holding in Lester seems to be in
accordance with the other jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue. 2 By widening the scope of the prejudgment hearing provided for in section 55-6-1, the court
is reading the potential danger of mistaken and arbitrary deprivations of debtor's
property prior to a trial on the merits.
After ruling that defenses may be presented at the prejudgment hearing, the
court next turned its attention to the appellants' specific defenses. The appellants
first claimed that the appellee's security interest was invalid under the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act4 3 because the furniture was inadequately identified in the financing agreement." While this would not be a defense to the underlying debt, it could destroy the security interest on which the plaintiff based its attempts
to repossess the furniture. 5 Since this was a potentially viable defense to the
attempted prejudgment seizure of the appellants' furniture, the supreme court
remanded the issue to the trial court for further development of the record in 6regard
to the adequacy of the descriptions contained in the security agreement.1
As a second defense to the seizure, the appellants claimed that the appellee
violated West Virginia law 7 by failing to advise them that they could obtain
insurance elsewhere. 8 The court rejected this claim, stating that even if it was true,
such a violation would be neither a defense to the seizure of the property nor a
" Lester, 309 S.E.2d at 76 (citing North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Hamrick v. Ashland Finance Co., 423 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); Yanero v. Fox, 256
S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1979); and Anderson v. George, 233 S.E.2d 407 (V. Va. 1977)).
40 Lester, 309 S.E.2d at 75. W. VA. CODE § 55-6-1.
4
Lester, 309 S.E.2d at 77.
41 See, e.g., Scutti Pontiac, Inc. v. Rund, 92 Misc. 2d 881, 402 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1978); Bennett
v. Wright, 79 Mich. App. 566, 263 N.W.2d 17 (1977); Detroit & Northern Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Woodworth, 54 Mich. App. 517, 221 N.W.2d 190 (1974). See also Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes
and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 408 (1973).
' W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-107(3) - 107(4) (1980).
" Lester, 309 S.E.2d at 77.

45
46

Id.
Id. at 78.

41 W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-109(2)(d) - 19(2)(e) (1980) prohibit creditors from requiring consumers
to purchase consumer credit insurance from such creditors as a prerequisite to receiving credit.
41 Lester, 309 S.E.2d at 78.
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defense to the underlying debt. 9 The appellants' second "defense" would therefore
be irrelevant to a prejudgment hearing under West Virginia's detinue statute.
In Sauls v. Howell," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of whether due process requirements mandate that a judgment debtor
receive notice that suggestion proceedings have been instituted by a judgment creditor
under West Virginia Code section 38-5-10.11 The court answered this question in
the affirmative, holding that a judgment debtor is entitled to notice of such proceedings and that the notice should include a copy of the summons issued upon
the suggestion pursuant to section 38-5-10.12

In Sauls, the appellant had been receiving monthly payments, in lieu of alimony,
from her ex-husband, pursuant to a divorce decree." After the appellant failed
to receive several of these installments, she requested the Boone County Circuit
Clerk, the appellee, to issue a summons upon a suggestion, pursuant to section
38-5-10, against her ex-husband's employer, the United States Steel Corporation,
to obtain certain profit sharing funds which she believed were owed her ex-husband. 4
The appellee refused to issue the summons upon the suggestion, stating in essence
that in addition to the original divorce decree, the appellant would be required
to obtain a judgment in circuit court to determine the amount presently owed the
appellant by her ex-husband.5 In a mandamus proceeding brought by the appellant,
the circuit court refused to compel the circuit clerk to issue the summons. 1
The supreme court, on appeal, overturned the circuit court's decision and held
that the appellant was not required to institute ancillary judicial proceedings to
reduce the amourlt owed to a "sum certain" as a prerequisite to the institution
of suggestion proceedings under West Virginia Code section 38-5-10.11 The court
further held that the unsatisfied payments ordered in the divorce decree were decret
judgments standing against the ex-husband and in favor of the appellant.2 As sucht,
49 Id.
10
"

Sauls v. Howell, 309 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. 1983).
W. VA. CODE § 38-5-10 (1966) deals with enforcement of an execution lien by providing a

procedure whereby a judgment creditor may recover from a third party personal property owed the
judgment debtor. The statute provides, in part:
Upon a suggestion by the judgment creditor that some person is indebted or liable to the
judgment debtor or has in his possession or under his control personal property belonging
to the judgment debtor, which debt or liability could be enforced, when due, or which property
could be recovered, when it became returnable, by the judgment debtor in a law court, and
which debt or liability or property is subject to the judgment creditor's writ of fieri facias,

a summons against such person may be sued out

. . .

requiring such person to answer such

suggestion in writing and under oath.
Sauls, 309 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 27.
4 Id. at 28.
5,Id.
s6 Id.
11

Id. at 29.

5" Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/13
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a simple mathematical calculation would suffice to determine the amount owed
at any one point in time. 9 This holding is a logical extension of prior decisions
by the court treating monthly alimony and child support payments in similar
fashion. 6" It alleviates the necessity for persons injured by defaulting ex-spouses
to obtain new "supplemental" judgments as installments mature and are unpaid.
The next issue dealt with by the court in Sauls was whether the appellant's
ex-husband was entitled to notice that she was instituting suggestion proceedings
pursuant to section 38-5-10. While it was admitted that no statute explicitly requires
a judgment debtor to be notified that the judgment creditor is instituting section
38-5-10 suggestion proceedings, 6' the court also determined that due process of the
law requires that debtors receive proper notice and a fair hearing before being
deprived of their property.6" In reaching its conclusion, the court was influenced
by the reasoning of various cases which held that prejudgment seizure of property
without prior notice of the property owner and a hearing is violative of due process
under the United States and West Virginia Constitutions. 63 The court further pronounced that, in regard to section 38-5-10, "proper" notice means that the judg6
ment debtor is entitled to a copy of the summons to be issued upon the suggestion. 1
No specific time period was established which must elapse between notice to
the judgment debtor and suggestion. However, the court's declaration that "[n]otice
to the judgment debtor of suggestion proceedings under W. Va. Code, 38-5-10
[1931], aids the judgment debtor in seeking appropriate legal remedies to challenge
the suggestion ' "6 indicates that due process requirements probably mandate that
a judgment debtor receive a reasonable amount of time between notice and suggestion in which to present legal challenges to the suggestion.
In ACF Industries v. Credithrift of America,66 the court addressed the issue
of whether a judgment debtor is entitled under West Virginia law to exempt $1,000.0067
from the net amount of wages which would be available for suggestee execution.
Id. (citing Korczyk v. Solonka, 130 W. Va. 211, 42 S.E.2d 814 (1947)).
See Hopkins v. Yarbrough, 284 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1981), and Korczyk v. Solonka, 130 W.Va.
211, 42 S.E.2d 814 (1947).
61 This is in contrast to W. VA. CODE §§ 38-5A-1 to -13 (1984) which deal with the issuance
of suggestee executions against judgment debtors' wages. Section 38-5A-4 specifically provides that "[a]
certified copy of an execution issued under this article against salary or wages shall be served upon
judgment debtor, "and the suggestee execution cannot be served upon the employer until at least five
days after notice has been given to the judgment debtor."
62 Sauls, 309 S.E.2d at 31.
65 See Sniadach v. Family Financing Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972).
64 Sauls, 309 S.E.2d at 31.
61

Id. at 32.

66

ACF Indus. v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 312 S.E.2d 746 (W. Va. 1983). This case was

originally published in slip opinion on March 10, 1983. It was subsequently recalled, rewritten, and
then published on November 14, 1983. The final result was a complete reversal of that originally reached.
The case as originally published was discussed in 86 W. VA. L. REv. 518.
617 ACF Industries, 312 S.E.2d at 746.
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Three statutes"8 were examined in pari materia by the court in an effort to derive
the legislature's intent. 69 The court dwelled on the express language of the three
statutes in reaching its conclusion that the $1,000.00 exemption under section 38-8-1
was meant to be applied not to total salary and wages, but only to those net amount
of wages which would be available for suggestee execution -under section 38-5A-3. "
In ACF Industries, the appellee, Credithrift of America, attempted to collect
on a judgment it had obtained against the appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Jackie E.
Stewart, by issuing a suggestee execution against Mr. Stewart's wages."' Responding to the suggestee execution, Mr. Stewart exempted $1,000.00 of his wages pursuant to section 38-8-1." ACF Industries attempted to comply with the personal
property exemption requirements by excluding the first $1,000.00 of Stewart's full
salary, after taxes, and withholding a portion of his salary in order to satisfy the
suggestee execution.73 After Stewart objected to the manner by which his exemption was computed, ACF Industries filed an interpleader action in circuit court. 74
At trial, the circuit court examined the relevant code sections 7 and held that the
$1,000.00 personal exemption was meant to be applied to the appellants' full amount
wages and not merely to the net amount which is subject
of after-tax salary and 76
to suggestee execution.
1, The three code sections which were relevant to the court's analysis are:
(1) W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-3 (Supp. 1984), which provides in pertinent part:
A judgment creditor may apply to the court.., for a suggestee execution against any money
due or to become due within one year after the issuance of such execution to the judgment
debtor as salary or wages arising out of any private employment ... the execution and expenses
thereof shall become a lien and continuing levy upon the salary or wages ... to an amount
equal to twenty per centum thereof and no more, but in no event shall the payments...
reduce the amount payable to the judgment debtor to an amount per week that is less than
thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage then in effect.
(2) W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-9 (1966), which states:
A judgment debtor to whom money is due or to become due which would otherwise be subject to suggestion under this article may have the same exempted from levy in the manner
and to the extent provided for by article eight [§ 38-8-1 et seq.] of this chapter. The exemption may be claimed for sums currently accruing but must be asserted anew as to any salary
or wages which shall begin to accrue after the next payment date. Such exemption shall not
be binding upon a suggestee unless and until a certificate of exemption or true copy thereof
shall have been delivered to him.
(3) W. VA. CODE § 38-8-1 (Supp. 1984) reads in pertinent part:
Any husband, wife, parent or other head of household residing in this State ... may set
apart and hold personal property not exceeding one thousand dollars in value to be exempt
from execution of other process ...

69 ACF Industries, 312 S.E.2d at 749.

Id. at 750.
Id. at 748.
72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

W. VA. CODE §§ 38-5A-3, 38-5A-9, and 38-8-1.
76 ACF Industries, 312 S.E.2d at 748.
"
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On appeal, the supreme court overturned the lower court's decision." Noting
that the general rule requires exemption statutes to be liberally construed in favor
of the debtor, 78 the court analyzed the language of the relevant statutory provisions. Heavy reliance was placed on the express language of section 38-5A-9, which
allows a judgment debtor to apply the $1,000.00 personal exemption under section
38-8-1 to those wages "which would otherwise be subject to suggestion" under
section 38-5A-3.79 Inasmuch as section 38-5A-3 limits the reach of a suggestee
execution to twenty percent of total wages, or the excess over thirty times the
minimum wage, whichever is less, the court felt that this is the amount which is
"otherwise subject to suggestion" under section 38-5A-9, and to which the section
38-8-1 personal exemption should be applied." Thus, the court concluded that West
Virginia law allows a judgment debtor to apply the section 38-8-1 $1,000.00 personal exemption to the net amount of wages available for suggestee execution under
section 38-5-3.8 '
In Southern ElectricalSupply Co. v. Raleigh County National Bank82 the court
considered the extent to which a bank can exercise its common law right of setoff
to transfer funds from one corporate account to another, where one person is the
majority and controlling stockholder of both corporations. The court held that,
in the absence of adequate evidence justifying a disregard for the separateness of
corporation's account in
two corporations, banks may not apply funds in8 one
3
indebtedness.
corporation's
another
of
satisfaction
The situation present in Southern Electricalinvolved two corporations: Gibson
Electric Company, an electrical contracting firm; and Southern Electrical Supply
Company, a dealer in electric materials. William Gibson was the controlling stockholder of both these companies. 8 4 Each company had its own separate account at the
Raleigh County National Bank.8 5 In 1980, Gibson Electric had contracted with
parties known as "Willis" and "Paul" to do electrical work at a coal preparation
plant being built in Kentucky." In June of 1980, Gibson Electric was delinquent
on loan payments owed to Raleigh County National Bank.8" Subsequent to this,
Willis and Paul attempted to deposit money in Southern Electrical's account by
wire transfer. 8 This money was apparently due Southern Electrical for supplies
, Id. at 750.
Id. at 749.
79 Id.
"

80Id.
11Id. at 750.

11Southern Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh County Nat'l Bank, No. 15974, slip op. (W. Va. July
11, 1984).
93Id.
at 1.
I Id.
85 Id.
16 Id. at 3.
17

Id. at 1.

"8

Id.
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furnished to Gibson Electric on the Kentucky project. 89 After initially depositing
these funds in Southern Electrical's account, the bank later canceled this deposit
and deposited the funds in Gibson Electric's account. The money was then
appropriated by the bank in partial satisfaction of Gibson Electric's debt. 9
Southern Electrical brought suit against the bank, claiming that the bank had
.converted its funds by transferring them to Gibson Electric's account without any
consent or authority to act in such a manner.' The bank attempted to justify its
behavior by alleging that Gibson Electric and Southern Electrical were alter egos
of William Gibson and, as such, they should be treated as one entity. 92 The bank
also contended that by directing Willis and Paul to deposit these funds in Southern
Electrical's account, Gibson Electric was attempting to fraudulently avoid liability
on its debt to the bank.13 At the conclusion of discovery, both sides moved for
partial summary judgment concerning the bank's liability. 4 Based on its conclusion that William Gibson had wrongfully directed funds belonging to Gibson Electric to be deposited in Southern Electrical's
account, the trial court granted sum95
mary judgment in favor of the bank.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision and granted summary judgment for Southern Electrical. The court
recognized that, while banks have a common law right to setoff, certain prerequisites must be met before the right may be exercised.96 The prerequisites which
must be met prior to setoff are: (1) existence of a debtor-creditor relationship between
bank and customer; (2) the customer must have a general deposit account in the
bank; and (3) mutuality of matured indebtedness. 7 In this case, the court determined that the prerequisites were not met, so the Raleigh County Bank had no
right to set off funds in Southern Electrical's account for Gibson Electric's debt. 9
While Southern Electrical did have a general deposit account in the bank, there
was no debtor-creditor relationship between them with mutual indebtedness.9 9 The
bank was indebted to Southern Electrical on the general deposit account, but there
was no corresponding debt owed by Southern Electrical to the bank. 00 This lack

1,Id. at
90Id. at
91Id. at
92Id.
91Id. at
94 Id. at
" Id. at

3.

I.
2.
3.
4.

10.

96 Id.

9, Id.
9s Id.
99 Id.

at 15.

,'Id. at 15 (citing Westerly Community Credit Union v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 103 R.I. 662,
240 A.2d 586 (1968) (denying a bank its setoff right where there was no mutuality)).
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of mutual indebtedness was the main factor in the court's decision to deny the
bank the right to set off funds in Southern Electrical's account for Gibson Electric's outstanding debt.'"' If the bank had been able to demonstrate that the two
corporations should be treated as one entity, then the "mutuality" obstacle might
have been overcome, in light of Gibson Electric's outstanding debt to the bank.
The court pointed out that, while the "corporate veil" may be pierced in order
to make a corporation liable for the actions of another corporation, this is not
to be done as a matter of course."' 2 The party asking the court to disregard the
corporate structure carries the burden of proving that sufficient factors exist which
justify such a disregard.' 3 Some of the factors which will be considered in deciding
whether to disregard the corporate form include: whether the corporation is undercapitalized; whether two corporations have comingled their funds so that their accounts are interchangeable; whether corporate formalities have been followed;
whether there is a unity of ownership and interest causing one entity to be indistinguishable from another; and whether there is total control of one corporation
by another. 04 These factors must be examined together with any evidence that a
corporation attempted to use its corporate structure to commit fraud or grave injustice against the complaining party. '
The court noted the presumptions that two separately incorporated companies
0 6
are separate entities and that corporations are distinct from their shareholders.
Common ownership or management, without supporting evidence such as fraudulent
conduct, comingling of funds, or total control was held insufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil.'0 7 The court further pointed out that both of these corporations served a separate purpose, though their businesses were related.' 0 Accordingly,
the court held that since Gibson Electric and Southern Electrical are separate, distinct
corporations, the bank was wrong in attempting to ignore this corporate separateness
by applying money authorized for one corporation's account in satisfaction of
another corporation's debt. The decision as to whether a corporate structure should
be disregarded is exclusively within the judicial province. As a rule of thumb, the
court stated, "In questionable situations a bank has a paramount obligation to
refrain from encroaching upon its customers' interests."' 0 9

'01

Southern Elec., No. 15974, slip op. at 18 (citing Southern States Coop. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d

821, 827 (W. Va. 1981)).

"I2Southern Elec., No. 15974, slip op. at 18 (citing Wheeling Kitchen Equip. Co. v. R & R Sewing

Center, 154 W. Va. 715, 179 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1971)).
10 Southern Elec., No. 15974, slip op. at 19.
"I Id. at 20.

1osId.
1o1Id. at 20-21.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 25.
109Id.
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MINERAL LEASES

McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
The recent West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision of McGinnis v.
Cayton10 discussed the availability of relief for those who have become successors
in interest to old, long-term natural gas leases providing for fixed yearly payments
which have become ridiculously inadequate as gas prices have risen over the years.
The appellants in McGinnis purchased land in Ritchie County and thereby became
parties to an oil and gas lease granted on the property in 1893."' The lease was
perpetually renewable, so long as oil or gas production on the property continued.
The lease's terms required the lessee to pay the lessor a one-eighth royalty on all
oil produced and one hundred dollars per year for the natural gas in each year
that gas was produced. The appellants brought suit, asking that the original lease
be reformed or voided on the ground that payment by the lessees of one hundred
dollars per year for the right to produce all of the natural gas on the property
was no longer commercially reasonable. Upon motion by the appellees, the trial
court dismissed the action prior to trial, ruling that the appellants stated no claim
upon which relief could be granted." 2
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Neely, reversed the lower
court's decision and remanded the case for trial, reiterating its policy favoring resolution of disputes on the merits." 3 While expressing no opinion as to the ultimate
merits of the case, the court pointed out that a fair examination of all the facts
and allegations presented reveals at least two legal theories upon which the appellants
4
might prevail at trial."
First, the court examined the potential applicability of the doctrine of mutual
mistake to the appellants' situation. The general proposition was put forth that
a mutual mistake as to a material assumption or fact underlying a contract is sufficient to void the agreement, provided that the risk was not contractually allocated. 'I
Because of its ruling that contractual rights are controlled by the law in effect when
the contract was executed," 6 the court felt it useful to look at Bluestone Coal Co.
v. Bell," 7 a somewhat analogous case which was decided at about the same time
that the lease in question was entered into.
In Bell, a long-term lease was established which gave the lessee the right to
mine coal and cut timber."' As the lessor expected to make substantial profits from
McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id.
1" Id
"I Id.

at
at
at
at
at

116 Id.

at 768.

"'
"

767.
767-68.
770.
768.
769.

.. Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell, 38 W. Va. 297, 18 S.E. 493 (1893).
11 Id.
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coal royalties, he only charged a nominal price for the timber. It subsequently turned
out that little mineable coal existed, and the lessor argued that the lease ought to
be rescinded." 19 After discussing the doctrine of mutual mistake, the supreme court
agreed that, since the existence of coal was a basic assumption upon which the
agreement was made, the nonexistence of coal was a sufficient ground for voiding
the lease.' 2
The McGinnis court contrasted and compared the situation to that in Bell.' 2'
While allowing that it might be possible that both of the original parties to the
McGinnis lease operated under a basic assumption that the value of natural gas
would remain negligible, the court also stressed that it was highly possible "that
the lessee was aware of the burgeoning market for natural gas and struck a very
advantageous bargain." 2 It was also noted that an argument could be made that
the original lessor, by accepting a fixed price for the production of natural gas
on his land, bore the risk of an increase in its value. 2 3 In any case, the supreme
court left the determination of the original parties' intentions to the trial court
on remand, where the appellants must bear the burden of proving that the original
parties operated under a mistaken assumption that went to the very essence of the
contract and that the lease did not allocate the risk of increasing gas values. The
court also stated that, on remand, the appellants should be permitted to develop
further their theory that the appellees had abandoned the lease.'12
The majority opinion in McGinnis failed to provide much overt guidance on
the extent to which various equitable principles may be utilized to reform or void
outdated gas leases. The court discussed the case, at least superficially, in terms
of a contract law analysis, yet the court narrowly restricted the grounds upon which
the appellants could challenge the lease at trial, to the neglect of other equitable
principles which are sometimes used as "outs" in contract cases. The court stated
that it was limiting the availability of equitable principles in aid of the appellants
because (1) the appellants were not original parties to the contract but became parties
to it after the increased value of natural gas had become apparent,' 5 and (2) the
appellants' demands were stale because they had allowed the lease to stand
unchallenged for an appreciable length of time.' 6 The court did allow the appellants
to utilize the doctrine of mutual mistake on remand, but their chances of success
with this doctrine would seem tenuous at best, for they must somehow prove what
was in the mind of the original parties to the lease at the time of its execution
almost one hundred years ago.
"M Id. at 496.
120Id. at 498.

,5'312 S.E.2d at 769.

,22Id. (footnote omitted).
123
"14
"56
12

Id.
Id. at 770.
Id.

[d.
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Though the analysis in McGinnis was based only upon the facts of that case,
the language used does not bode well for those who would desire to reform or
void outdated gas leases by relying upon the full range of equitable principles which
are sometimes used in contract situations. Persons not original parties to the gas
lease (or perhaps their heirs) would be severely restricted in their attempts to utilize
such principles. The mutual mistake doctrine would not be of much help so long
as the court requires that the intent of the original parties be proved, since many
of these oil and gas leases were executed in the 1800's.
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice Harshbarger disagreed with the narrow scope of the majority opinion. He felt that the court should have permitted
the appellants to utilize the much broader range of equitable principles, such as
unilateral mistake, 7 commercial impracticability, 8 and unconscionability,'" 9 which
are sometimes used to reform or rescind contracts. Justice Harshbarger also pointed
out that the court appeared to be closing the door which had been opened in lafolla
v. Douglas PocahontasCoal Corp.,3 where the court had indicated that it might
be receptive to an unconscionability-type argument to void a mineral lease where
unforeseen, changing circumstances had rendered the lease grossly unfair. 3 '
James Robert Williamson

'"
lOS

Id.
Id.

at 773.
at 774.

'2'

Id.

at 776.

Id.

at 133.

,30 250 S.E.2d 128 (f.
'

Va. 1978).
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